Appendix

(Not for Print Publication)

This appendix includes supplementary information about the data, as well as a series of supplementary analyses and robustness checks. Specifically, the additional analyses show the following:

- The results are robust to the use of OECD countries as potential mediators, rather than major powers.

- The results are not driven by the presence of India.

- The results are mostly robust to the exclusion of high-intermediate-importing countries.

- The results are robust to the exclusion of major powers.

- The results hold to a lesser degree for all cases of mediation

- The results are robust to the exclusion of attributes of the state involved in the civil war.

Summary Statistics

	No of Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Mediation Onset (All)	576	0.417	0.493	0	1
Mediation Onset (Major Powers)	576	0.116	0.321	0	1
Intermediate exports (Logged)	576	11.489	3.711	0.019	17.647
Intermediate imports (Logged)	576	12.661	2.819	0	17.750
Intermediate exports (Share)	576	0.396	0.729	0	6.299
Intermediate imports (Share)	576	0.409	0.744	0	7.504
GDP per capita	514	1885.953	4568.409	112.531	43342.136
Total trade (logged)	576	9.244	2.294	0	14.725
Colonial ties	576	0.561	0.497	0	1
Polity score	561	1.708	6.223	-9	10
Capabilities	576	1.643	2.712	0.003	15.376
Africa	576	0.340	0.474	0	1
Asia	576	0.533	0.499	0	1
Failed mediations	576	0.132	1.006	0	13
Ongoing mediations	576	0.003	0.059	0	1
Year	576	1999	5.662	1991	2011
Years Since Conflict Onset	576	5.351	7.028	0	35

Table A1: Summary statistics

OECD Countries

The primary analysis looks at mediation by major powers, as given by the Correlates of War dataset. Conceptually, Singer (1988, 119) defines a major power as follows: "a major power in any period is a state that is regarded by othersespecially the other and typically more well-established majorsone ofthat small 'oligarchy,' to use Schwarzenberger's expression, that dominates not only in the region of each member, but globally as well. These states have taken on global 'interests' and do a fair job of defending them. " For the period under investigation, this group comprises the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, Germany, and Japan. It makes sense to use this group of states, as they are especially powerful and pervasive in world affairs, and—unlike some other states—they have the ability to project their power virtually anywhere on the globe.

However, the study here concerns economic factors and their relationship to mediation decisions. Thus, we may be more interested in a measure of power that is primarily economic in nature, rather than military or diplomatic. For that reason, I create an alternative dependent variable that takes a value of one if a civil war experiences mediation by a country that is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and zero otherwise. There is significant overlap between the two lists. However, the OECD comprises thirty-four member states, most of whom are not considered major powers. Additionally, two of the major powers—Russia and China—are not OECD members.

The results from the alternative specification are provided below. Substantively, the estimates are highly similar, suggesting that intermediate trade is important for great powers, whether measured in terms of military, economic, or diplomatic influence.

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.31***	3.26***	0.58***	10.58***
	(0.11)	(0.80)	(0.14)	(2.14)
Intermediate imports			−1.05***	−7.96***
			(0.26)	(2.27)
GDP per capita	0.00***	−0.00	0.00***	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total trade (logged)	−0.61***	−0.33**	0.21	0.17
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.19)
Colonial ties	0.55	1.19***	0.64*	1.17**
	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.46)
Polity score	−0.02	−0.00	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Capabilities	−0.63***	−1.54***	−0.62***	−4.32***
	(0.24)	(0.45)	(0.21)	(0.94)
Africa	−0.42	−0.81	−0.23	0.08
	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.74)
Asia	0.72	0.79	1.01*	1.75**
	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.69)
Failed mediations	0.13	0.12	0.16*	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Ongoing mediations	2.85*	1.16	2.85*	0.30
	(1.49)	(1.52)	(1.55)	(1.59)
Time	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.18
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Time^2	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	−0.25	0.35	1.94	−3.85**
	(1.21)	(1.21)	(1.37)	(1.70)
Number of observation	510	510	510	510
Log-likelihood	−151.00	−145.20	−141.72	−125.60
AIC	330.00	318.41	313.44	281.20

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A2: Effect of intermediate trade on probability of mediation by an OECD member

Excluding Potentially Influential Observations

One concern with the results presented in the main text may be that they are driven by great powers, which tend to be high intermediate importers and, at the same time, are particularly unlikely to welcome interference in their affairs (in the form of mediation or otherwise). For this reason, it is worthwhile to take a look at the distribution of observatoins, and to examine whether these types of observations exert some kind of undue influence upon the results. I look first at the data in general.


Figure A1: Intermediate imports and frequency of appearance

Figure A1 depicts the data in the analysis, with each point representing a mediation candidate country, designated by its COW abbreviation. The *x*-axis corresponds to the country's average value of intermediate imports (in logged USD) for all dispute-years in the data set for

which it is present. The *y*-axis gives the number of dispute-years in which that country appears. Looking at the figure, there is one notable outlier: India. It has an average level of intermediate imports of approximately 15.59, putting it in the top decile of countries being analyzed. It also appears in the data set 94 times (of 576 total observations), constituting more than 16% of the data. I first demonstrate that the results are not driven by India.

The results in Table A3 are substantively similar to those in the main text. There are no changes in sign or significance for any variables of interest. This suggests that India is not driving the results. However, it may not be India alone. Other large importers may also be exerting an influence on the outcome. Therefore, I set a threshold of 15, which corresponds roughly to the top quartile of countries, and I mark the associated observations for deletion. I then reestimate the analysis with those dispute-years omitted.

Table A4 displays the reuslts of the analysis with high-intermediate-importing mediation candidates omitted.[1] Again, the results are similar to those found in the main analysis. The primary difference in this case is that the log of intermediate exports in the first model no longer attains statistical significance. However, it is signed correctly, and remains statistically significant across the other three models (all of which sport lower AIC values). Therefore, while there is less precision in Table A4, it does seem to indicate that the results are not driven by high intermediate importers.

One final issue is that the results may not be influenced by high intermediate importers per se (e.g., India may not be the culprit here), but by great powers, who happen to be major importers. To ensure that this is not the case, I run a final set of models, excluding mediation candidates that are classified as major powers by the COW dataset.

Table A5 shows the results of the analysis with major power candidates omitted. Notably, there are relatively few such cases. Indeed, major power disputes comprise less than 3% of

---

[1]The astute reader will notice that the *Ongoing mediations* variable is missing from the table. This is because, after excluding about 25% of the data set, there is too little variation remaining on that variable.

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.31**	2.36***	0.70***	10.44***
	(0.13)	(0.81)	(0.17)	(2.32)
Intermediate imports			−1.46***	−10.36***
			(0.32)	(2.62)
GDP per capita	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total trade (logged)	−0.74***	−0.40***	0.46	0.30
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.34)	(0.21)
Colonial ties	0.18	0.65	0.54	0.46
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Polity score	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Capabilities	−0.33	−1.15**	−0.42*	−4.10***
	(0.30)	(0.48)	(0.25)	(0.99)
Africa	−0.75	−1.07	−0.82	0.51
	(0.70)	(0.71)	(0.77)	(0.91)
Asia	0.96	1.03*	1.04	2.63***
	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.64)	(0.84)
Failed mediations	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.07
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Ongoing mediations	3.34**	1.93	3.32*	1.12
	(1.65)	(1.58)	(1.85)	(1.61)
Time	−0.10	−0.07	−0.04	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Time^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	0.79	1.02	3.32**	−5.05**
	(1.33)	(1.31)	(1.54)	(2.00)
Number of observation	405	405	405	405
Log-likelihood	−124.63	−122.85	−111.72	−101.88
AIC	277.26	273.71	253.44	233.76

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A3: Effect of intermediate trade with India omitted

the data (about fourteen cases). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the results are quite similar to those depicted in the main text. The estimates given here and in the tables above suggest that the results in the main text are not simply an artifact of one or a few specific cases. Rather, they

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.12	4.94**	0.43**	5.84*
	(0.13)	(2.19)	(0.17)	(3.08)
Intermediate imports			−1.28***	−23.52***
			(0.32)	(7.37)
GDP per capita	0.00**	0.00	0.00***	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total trade (logged)	−0.47**	−0.23	0.60*	0.19
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.35)	(0.21)
Colonial ties	0.50	0.80	0.87	0.49
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.50)
Polity score	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Capabilities	−0.46	−2.10**	−0.51*	−1.59
	(0.39)	(0.97)	(0.30)	(1.29)
Africa	−0.97	−0.77	−1.39	−0.63
	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.88)	(0.88)
Asia	0.55	1.07	0.26	1.30
	(0.70)	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.85)
Time	−0.23	−0.20	−0.15	−0.09
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Time^2	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	0.61	−0.38	3.36**	−3.48*
	(1.46)	(1.57)	(1.71)	(1.92)
Number of observation	352	352	352	352
Log-likelihood	−103.79	−101.06	−94.11	−91.40
AIC	233.49	228.10	216.18	210.80

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A4: Effect of intermediate trade with major intermediate importers omitted

appear to be a relatively robust set of findings.

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.31**	3.89***	0.66***	13.41***
	(0.13)	(1.00)	(0.17)	(3.70)
Intermediate imports			−1.35***	−17.48***
			(0.32)	(5.93)
GDP per capita	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total trade (logged)	−0.58***	−0.34**	0.48	0.26
	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.21)
Colonial ties	0.14	0.94*	0.51	0.50
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Polity score	−0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Capabilities	−1.45**	−2.53***	−1.10**	−1.90**
	(0.68)	(0.96)	(0.56)	(0.88)
Africa	−0.44	−1.08	−0.67	0.81
	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.80)	(0.98)
Asia	1.35**	1.06*	1.21*	2.74***
	(0.67)	(0.64)	(0.70)	(0.93)
Failed mediations	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Ongoing mediations	3.67**	1.86	3.49**	0.82
	(1.53)	(1.57)	(1.67)	(1.75)
Time	−0.11	−0.06	−0.03	0.01
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Time^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	−0.47	0.46	2.38	−5.18**
	(1.45)	(1.44)	(1.65)	(2.13)
Number of observation	485	485	485	485
Log-likelihood	−118.09	−112.66	−107.57	−97.70
AIC	264.18	253.31	245.13	225.40

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A5: Effect of intermediate trade with major powers omitted

Mediation By Any State

The primary analysis focuses on mediation by major powers, for reasons outlined in the main text. Major powers have greater ability to intervene in conflicts around the globe, and they are able to bring to bear certain resources that other states cannot. Earlier in the appendix, I show that similar results hold for OECD countries. However, we may also wonder to what extent intermediate trade matters for mediation in a general sense. In other words, are high intermediate exporters simply more likely to see intervention in general? I investigate this possibilty by recoding the dependent variable as a one if an episode experiences any mediation at all, and a zero otherwise.[2]

The results of the analysis are given in Table A6. They are generally similar to those in the main text, suggesting that intermediate trade does have a general influence on the likelihood of mediation. Notably, however, the results are weaker in this analysis. Log of intermediate imports fails to attain statistical significance in the third model, while the log of intermediate exports is significant only at the $p < .10$ level. Moreover, the coefficients have shrunk across the models. And indeed, a comparison of substantive effects indicates that intermediate exports have a smaller average effect on the overall probability of mediation than on the probability of mediation by major powers.

Figure A2 depicts the average predicted probability of mediation by any state to mediation by major powers, as we vary share of intermediate exports and imports across their empirical ranges, with the other held constant at its mean. Predicted values come from column four of Table A6 for comparability with the figure in the main text. While the effects are signed the same and are significant across all cases, the slopes are shallower than they are in the main analysis. This suggests that, although there is a real effect for intermediate trade and mediation in a general sense, it may act primarily through the activation of great power mediators.

---

[2]For obvious reasons, this necessitates the omission of the *Failed Mediation* and *Ongoing Mediation* variables.

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.14*	2.09***	0.16*	4.15***
	(0.08)	(0.63)	(0.09)	(0.89)
Intermediate imports			−0.09	−2.49***
			(0.19)	(0.70)
GDP per capita	0.00**	−0.00	0.00**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total trade (logged)	−0.31**	−0.16*	−0.23	0.02
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.11)
Colonial ties	1.31***	1.59***	1.33***	1.58***
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Polity score	0.06**	0.07**	0.06**	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Capabilities	−0.90***	−1.43***	−0.90***	−1.92***
	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.44)
Africa	1.09**	0.99**	1.05**	1.29***
	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.49)
Asia	−0.72	−0.67	−0.75*	−0.37
	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Time	0.34***	0.38***	0.35***	0.41***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Time^2	−0.03***	−0.04***	−0.03***	−0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time^3	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	0.06	0.14	0.30	−1.40
	(0.89)	(0.87)	(1.01)	(0.99)
Number of observation	499	499	499	499
Log-likelihood	−201.46	−197.43	−201.34	−188.15
AIC	426.92	418.86	428.68	402.29

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A6: Effect of intermediate trade on mediation by any party

Figure A2: Effects of intermediate exports on probability of mediation by any party

Removing Candidate Attributes

The unit of analysis for the main set of regressions is the dispute-year. However, each dispute is uniquely associated with a candidate country involved in a civil war. Therefore, many of the control variables used in the models are country-level controls (e.g., regime type or per capita GDP). These variables appear in the analysis to ensure that intermediate trade is not simply proxying for some other concept (such as democracy, or economic or military power). However, some readers may wonder whether these control variables overcomplicate the model. Therefore, I run three additional sets of regressions, which remove candidate-level controls from the model, and present the results here.

Tables A7 through A9 present the results of a series of estimations with progressively fewer control variables. Table A7 removes only the regime type and per capita GDP variables, leaving all others; Table A8 further removes the total trade variable; and Table A9 eliminates all candidate-country-level controls, retaining only information about previous mediation attempts and the cubic polynomial for time since dispute onset.

There are a few things to note about these results. First, in terms of fit, there is no way to compare these models to the table in the main text. Some of the key control variables contain missing values for particular observations, leaving me with 499 observations in the primary analysis, versus 576 here. However, the twelve models across these three tables use the same dependent variable and the same 576 observations, and so they are comparable with respect to one another. As with the results in the main analysis, the lowest AIC in each table is found in the fourth column, which includes global shares of intermediate imports and exports. Moreover, the AIC values are significantly lower for Tables A7 and A8 than for Table A9, suggesting that there is some value to the inclusion of many of the country-level controls.

The variables of interest prove mostly robust to the exclusion of control variables, particularly across the models that fare better on goodness-of-fit criteria. The results in Table A7 are

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.16**	2.34***	0.43***	7.10***
	(0.08)	(0.59)	(0.11)	(1.37)
Intermediate imports			−0.43***	−5.99***
			(0.12)	(1.74)
Total trade (logged)	−0.27**	−0.26***	−0.11	−0.11
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Colonial ties	−0.01	0.35	0.13	0.10
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.40)
Capabilities	−0.94**	−1.64***	−1.01**	−2.98***
	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.59)
Africa	−1.39***	−1.64***	−1.52***	−1.45***
	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.51)
Asia	0.02	0.08	−0.23	0.57
	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.50)
Failed mediations	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.08
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Ongoing mediations	3.00**	2.19	3.20**	1.99
	(1.49)	(1.51)	(1.63)	(1.55)
Time	−0.24	−0.22	−0.12	−0.25
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Time^2	0.03*	0.03*	0.02	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00*	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	−0.15	1.08	0.76	0.25
	(0.82)	(0.76)	(0.83)	(0.79)
Number of observation	576	576	576	576
Log-likelihood	−169.68	−161.45	−162.12	−143.97
AIC	363.35	346.90	350.24	313.94

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A7: Effect of intermediate trade with regime type and GDPpc omitted

substantively similar to those in the main text. The estimates in Table A8 are mostly similar, though logged intermediate exports do not attain significance in the first column (the AIC suggests that, in this case, fit was worsened by removing trade). The results shown in Table A9 are quite different, particularly when not accounting for intermediate imports. In both cases, the effect of exports is improperly signed, and fails to reach significance at the $p < .05$ level ($p < 0.08$ in the second column). However, these two columns show the worst fit of any of the twelve by

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	0.05	1.84***	0.41***	7.12***
	(0.06)	(0.52)	(0.11)	(1.36)
Intermediate imports			−0.47***	−6.52***
			(0.11)	(1.67)
Colonial ties	0.17	0.43	0.21	0.06
	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.39)
Capabilities	−1.21***	−2.07***	−1.09***	−3.05***
	(0.45)	(0.54)	(0.42)	(0.58)
Africa	−1.72***	−1.70***	−1.64***	−1.42***
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.51)
Asia	−0.34	−0.19	−0.39	0.53
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.50)
Failed mediations	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.08
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Ongoing mediations	2.84*	2.33	3.14**	2.00
	(1.45)	(1.47)	(1.59)	(1.53)
Time	−0.29**	−0.29*	−0.14	−0.27*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Time^2	0.04**	0.04**	0.02	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	−0.92	−0.62	0.60	−0.48
	(0.72)	(0.39)	(0.82)	(0.41)
Number of observation	576	576	576	576
Log-likelihood	−172.74	−165.31	−162.57	−144.52
AIC	367.47	352.63	349.14	313.04

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A8: Effect of intermediate trade with regime type, GDPpc, and total trade omitted

far. And once intermediate imports enter the equation, the effect of exports regains the appropriate sign and level of significance.

These results provide additional evidence that the findings reported in the main text are not a matter of chance. The effects of intermediate trade are robust across various model specifications, and the control variables in the main text remain an important means of distinguishing the impact of intermediate trade from correlated attributes of mediation candidates.

	Logged Value	Global Share	Logged Value	Global Share
Intermediate exports	−0.05	−0.44*	0.29***	0.97***
	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.36)
Intermediate imports			−0.47***	−2.82***
			(0.11)	(0.70)
Failed mediations	−0.02	−0.03	0.01	−0.07
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Ongoing mediations	2.44*	2.61*	2.84*	2.67*
	(1.45)	(1.45)	(1.47)	(1.50)
Time	−0.38***	−0.38***	−0.27*	−0.33**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Time^2	0.05***	0.05***	0.04*	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time^3	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intercept	−1.10**	−1.53***	0.79	−1.40***
	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.62)	(0.21)
Number of observation	576	576	576	576
Log-likelihood	−199.12	−198.16	−187.43	−186.96
AIC	412.24	410.32	390.87	389.93

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*p < .10$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed tests.

Table A9: Effect of intermediate trade with country-level controls omitted

References

Singer, J. David. 1988. "Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985." *International Interactions* 14(2):115–132.